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The author reviews all of the recent cases and legislation in
the area of family law in Florida. The topics surveyed include
dissolution of marriage, alimony, child support, property prob-
lems arising from dissolution, and miscellaneous related areas.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The quantity of family law cases has begun recently to increase
in the manner of a geometric progression. As an illustration, the
previous Survey' covered a period of approximately two years, and
reviewed thirty-two volumes of the Southern Reporter. This Survey
covers nearly the same number of cases over a one year period and
reviews twenty-two volumes of the Southern Reporter.2 This trou-
bling increase in the number of cases is not, of course, confined
solely to the area of family law. Perhaps this burgeoning number of
cases in most areas of the law will cause many lawyers and judges
to "shoot from the hip," and a self-generating stimulus for more
appellate cases will result because the lawyers are unable, within
time and economic limitations, to handle the existing body of law.
Specialization, the use of paralegal personnel and computer re-
1. Murray, Family Law, Survey of Florida Law, 30 U. MIAMI L. REV. 107 (1975).
2. The material surveyed includes the cases reported in 316 So. 2d 1 through 338 So. 2d
1242, and the legislation enacted by the 1976 Legislature.
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trieval of cases may prevent, or perhaps only delay, the complete
collapse of the case system.
II. MARRIAGE
In an apparent case of first impression in Florida, a district
court has held that although it is customary for a woman to adopt
her husband's surname upon marriage, there is no legal requirement
that she do so.' As a result, she may use her maiden name and
obtain a Florida driver's license in her maiden name.
When a woman marries her second husband before her divorce
from her first husband has become final, her second marriage is
invalid. But the District Court of Appeal, First District, has held in
such a case that if the woman and her second husband were ignorant
of the impediment to the marriage, the impediment had ceased to
exist prior to the abolition of common law marriage in Florida, and
the parties had continued to live with each other, the marriage
becomes a valid common law marriage.4
III. DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE
A. Jurisdiction
Sections 49.11 and 49.12 of the Florida Statutes (1975) permit
indigents to secure jurisdiction over nonresident defendants in dis-
solution of marriage proceedings and in adoption proceedings by
posting notices in three prominent places in the county and by
mailing notice to the defendant at his last known residence in lieu
of publication notice in a legal newspaper. These provisions have
been upheld as constitutional by the Florida Supreme Court.'
If a wife's attorney unsuccessfully challenges the jurisdiction of
a California court over the subject matter of a divorce proceeding,
but makes no challenge to jurisdiction over the wife's person, this
constitutes a general appearance, and the California court's divorce
decree will be held valid in Florida. 6
A sworn statement for service of process by publication which
sets forth the last known "address" of a defendant does not comply
with the requirements of sections 49.031 and 49.041 of the Florida
3. Davis v. Roos, 326 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
4. Day v. Day, 331 So. 2d 335 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
5. Sheppard v. Sheppard, 329 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1976).
6. Coyne v. Coyne, 325 So. 2d 407 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
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Statutes (1975). These sections require a statement of the defen-
dant's "residence," and last known "address" is not the equivalent
of "regidence." Thus, in a Fourth District case, the allegation of an
incorrect address, instead of a residence, resulted in the court's not
having jurisdiction, and a dissolution judgment was vacated even
though the wife had remarried immediately after the dissolution.7
In a suit brought against a nonresident defendant in which
jurisdiction has been obtained by constructive process, a Florida
court does not have jurisdiction over real and personal property
located within Florida when neither the notice of the action nor the
complaint contains a legal description of the real property.' Section
49.08 (4) of the Florida Statutes (1975) requires that the notice of
publication describe the real property. In order to satisfy the re-
quirements of due process, the complaint must also describe the real
and personal property over which jurisdiction is being sought.
B. Venue
When an action is brought in Florida to establish a Mexican
divorce decree as a Florida judgment and to enforce its terms, the
proper venue is determined under section 47.011 of the Florida Stat-
utes (1975).1 Under this section, venue lies in the county where the
defendant resides. Section 61.14, (Florida Statutes (1975)), in con-
trast, governs the venue when suit is brought to modify alimony
judgments, separation agreements, etc. Under this section, venue is
in the county of residence of either party.
The District Court of Appeal, First District, has held, in opposi-
tion to an opinion of the Second District, 0 that the cause of action
for marriage dissolution cases arises in the county in which the
spouses were last present with intent to remain married rather than
in another county where the events occurred which finally destroyed
the marriage." The Supreme Court of Florida has affirmed the First
District's position."2
The venue for a dissolution of marriage action lies not in the
county where a breach may have occurred, but in the county in
7. Callaghan v. Callaghan, 337 So. 2d 986 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
8. Lahr v. Lahr, 337 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
9. Ruscoe v. Ruscoe, 327 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
10. Arnold v. Arnold, 273 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
11. Carroll v. Carroll, 322 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
12. Carroll v. Carroll, No. 48,495 (Fla. Sup. Ct. Jan. 13, 1977).
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which "the intact marriage was last evidenced by a continuing
union of partners."' 3 As a result, in a Fourth District case, Pinellas
County was the proper venue for dissolution proceedings since the
spouses had last lived together there, it was claimed by the husband
as his homestead for tax purposes, and he had listed this county as
his home on his driver's license. Moreover, the wife had never visted
in nor lived in Dade County where the husband took up his resi-
dence approximately seven years prior to the dissolution proceed-
ings.
A costly use of venue gamesmanship was illustrated in a recent
case in which a marriage was entered into and then broken in Geor-
gia. The wife subsequently moved to Alachua County, Florida,
where she instituted suit against her nonresident husband for cus-
tody and support of a minor child. The husband then moved to
Gadsden County, Florida. Still later, the wife amended her action
in Alachua County to ask for dissolution of the marriage. The appel-
late court held that venue was properly laid in Alachua County for
the custody and support action, but that the husband had the right
to insist that the dissolution action be brought in Gadsden County,
the place of his residence. 4 As a result, two different courts are going
to be cluttered with one family squabble. The decision seems to be
correct, but an amendment to the statute5 appears warranted.
C. In Camera Hearings
The District Court of Appeal, First District, has refused to fol-
low the case of State ex rel. Gore Newspapers Co. v. Tyson," de-
cided by the Fourth District. The Gore court held that a writ of
prohibition would lie to prevent a trial judge from excluding the
public from a dissolution of marriage hearing. In contrast the First
District has held that although it might be an abuse of discretion
for a trial court judge to exclude the public from a dissolution of
marriage proceeding (the issue was not decided), the trial court
judge does have jurisdiction to do so."' A writ of prohibition thus will
lie only when the court lacks jurisdiction.
13. Auritt v. Auritt, 334 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
14. Rivenbark v. Rivenbark, 335 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
15. FLA. STAT. § 47.011 (1975).
16. 313 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975), noted in 30 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1075 (1976).
17. State ex rel. English v. McCrary, 328 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
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D. Defenses
Sexual relations indulged in by the spouses while they are en-
gaged in dissolution proceedings is not enough to show a clear intent
to reconcile and to justify a trial court in denying a judgment of
dissolution of the marriage.'"
Rule 1.420(e) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure only re-
quires the dismissal of a case when it has not been prosecuted to-
ward a final judgment. It does not apply to a lack of prosecution for
matters occurring after the judgment.'"
It is a gross abuse of discretion and reversible error for a trial
court to refuse to vacate and set aside a final judgment of dissolu-
tion when the moving party has not received notice of the final
hearing.20
E. Procedure
Section 90.242(3)(b) of the Florida Statutes (1975) provides
that in a civil proceeding wherein a party "introduces his mental
condition as an element of his claim or defense," the party may not
claim a privilege for any relevant communications made to his or
her psychiatrist. This provision has been construed to mean that a
mother, by simply seeking custody of her children, has not made her
mental condition "an element of her claim or defense" thereby
waiving her privilege, even though the mental health of a parent
may well have been a relevant issue.2' The trial court may order the
mother to be examined by a court-appointed psychiatrist, rather
than forcing her private psychiatrist to divulge confidential commu-
nications.
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.380(d) permits a trial court
to strike a party's pleadings and to refuse to permit her to introduce
any evidence relative to her claims for support, court costs, attorney
fees, etc., when 'she has failed to answer interrogatories submitted
by her husband. A district court has affirmed the action of a trial
court which struck such pleadings even though no motion or order
was ever made to compel her to answer. The court noted that most
of its sister courts had been more lenient.2 2
18. Smith v. Smith, 322 So. 2d 580 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
19. Ravel v. Ravel, 326 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
20. Barry v. Barry, 324 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
21. Roper v. Roper, 336 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).





The Supreme Court of Florida has held that although it may
be "prudent" for a trial court judge to reserve jurisdiction to award
alimony in the future when he has denied it in the final judgment,
this is a matter of judicial discretion." He is not required as a matter
of law to reserve jurisdiction upon pain of reversal for failure to do
so. Further, an intermediate appellate court should not substitute
its judgment for that of the trial court in the awarding or denial of
alimony, child support, etc.
In the view of at least one district court, it is reversible error to
award alimony to commence six months after the date of the judg-
ment because of a difference between the husband's past and pres-
ent income.24 If his income were presently insufficient, then no ali-
mony should be awarded, but jurisdiction ought to be retained to
award alimony in the future if his income were to increase.
In the ordinary case where an order awarding rehabilitative
alimony has a fixed termination date and the court does not reserve
jurisdiction, the court will not have jurisdiction to modify the ali-
mony award after the termination date. On the other hand, if at the
date of termination the husband were in arrears in paying the ali-
mony, it has been held (in a case of first impression in Florida) that
since the court has jurisdiction to enforce the payment of accrued
sums, it also has jurisdiction to modify by awarding an increase in
alimony." The court found that failure to pay has the effect of
extending the jurisdiction of the court to increase the award.
2d 690 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976), for an example of a more lenient judicial attitude than that
evinced in the Fearns decision. In Flynt, a default judgment was entered, dissolving the
marriage upon the wife's petition when the husband failed to answer pleadings or appear. A
month later, the husband filed his own petition for dissolution, which was dismissed. The
husband, learning of the prior final judgment and the dismissal of his suit, moved to set aside
the judgment. He claimed he had been misled into not appearing. The trial court set aside
the final judgment, but the District Court of Appeals, Fourth District, reversed, and re-
manded for an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the motion.
23. Shaw v. Shaw, 334 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1976). See Hayes v. Hayes, 325 So. 2d 455 (Fla.
1st Dist. 1976) (jurisdiction should be reserved under appropriate circumstances).
24. Gesford v. Gesford, 337 So. 2d 1017 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976). However, Judge Mager's
dissenting opinion seems to be a more intelligent approach to the problem of interpreting the
final decree of the trial court. In the dissent's view, the trial court's determination was not
speculative as to whether alimony could be paid in six months. It was based on varying
factors, including the party's earning capacity.
25. Brown v. Brown, 338 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
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The trial court has jurisdiction to modify the amount of ali-
mony which was set by the agreement of the parties entered into
during the dissolution proceedings. The agreement in this situation
was incorporated into the final judgment at the instance of the wife
who filed a petition for redetermination of alimony prior to the
expiration of the period set for the payment of periodic alimony."9
A trial court judge has the power to modify the recommendations
of a special master which deal with the award of rehabilitative ali-
mony when the evidence shows that the master's recommendations
are clearly erroneous." A trial court judge who reserves jurisdiction
to adjudicate alimony, property rights, etc., at a later date in ac-
cordance with a stipulation of the parties cannot subsequently
change his mind and enter a nunc pro tunc order stating that the
court had not reserved jurisdiction. A nunc pro tunc order is de-
signed to correct clerical errors or omissions; it cannot modify the
gubgtance of a prior ruling. 2
B. Criteria for the Award
In order to determine whether alimony should be awarded, a
trial court must consider the wife's needs, her standard of living
during the marriage and the husband's ability to pay. Therefore, if
the husband misrepresented his income and the court denied ali-
mony to the wife, she may file a motion to set aside the judgment
on the grounds of newly discovered evidence. If she were able to
support herself, it would be reversible error for the trial court to
deny her motion to set aside the judgment on the ground that the
alleged misrepresentation of her husband would be irrelevant. 9
A trial court may consider testimony dealing with the hus-
band's persistent adulterous conduct as a factor in awarding ali-
mony and in other related matters. 0 The court, however, is not to
conduct an unlimited foray into all areas. It must keep the inquiry
within reasonable bounds.
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, has adopted the
26. Hernandez v. Hernandez, 325 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
27. Goldberg v. Goldberg, 327 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
28. DeBaun v. Michael, 333 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
29. Caracristi v. Caracristi, 324 So. 2d 634 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
30. McClelland v. McClelland, 318 So. 3d 160 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975), following Pro v. Pro,




view that a wife does not have the right to be supported forever after
the divorce when she has the capacity for self-support. When the
facts show that a former wife is now earning $15,000 per year, and
the children are no longer living at home, a trial court should modify
a former award by deleting all alimony to the wife, despite the fact
that the husband has a substantial income." In dictum, one district
court has noted that a "spouse may not be required to work unu-
sually long hours in order to earn an exorbitant income to support
familial obligations."3
A husband who has established a high standard of living for his
family will be compelled to continue to maintain this standard upon
dissolution of the marriage unless he is able to show a diminution
of income which was not self-induced.
33
It is reversible error for a trial court, having found that a wife
is entitled to alimony from her husband, to order that she pay ali-
mony to him.34 It would appear that if a wife were in financial need
of alimony she should not be deprived of it solely because she shot
and wounded her husband after he filed suit for dissolution but
before final judgment.
35
It is an abuse of discretion for a trial court to award a relatively
young, healthy wife who has good employment capabilities and who
has been married only sixteen months, $521,000 alimony even
though her husband, with assets of $13,000,000, is well able to pay
that amount .3 The fact that a husband is wealthy does not entitle
the wife to an award disproportionate to her needs.
C. Duration of the Award
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, has noted that
because a court has no authority to order a former husband to pay
alimony from his estate after his death, it may not order him to
make his former wife the irrevocable beneficiary of life insurance
policies on his life for a period of five years.37 On the other hand, the
31. Anderson v. Anderson, 333 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976); accord, Denny v. Denny,
334 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976); see Anderson v. Anderson, 194 So. 2d 906, 909 (Fla. 1967),
for original advancement of the view adopted by the court in the later Anderson case.
32. Norton v. Norton, 328 So. 2d 484, 486 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1916).
33. Hausman v. Hausman, 330 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
34. Palmer v. Palmer, 330 So. 2d 839 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
35., De Castro v. De Castro, 334 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
36. Gordon v. Gordon, 335 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
37. Blass v. Blass, 316 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
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court has the power to order him to provide a major medical insur-
ance policy for her benefit and the benefit of their minor children.
The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, has agreed with
the Third District that a court does not have the power to order that
alimony be a charge against the estate of a husband after his death
unless the husband has agreed to it. 31 In addition, when a final
decree of dissolution orders the husband to make the mortgage pay-
ments on the marital home but the decree is silent regarding the
question of alimony, the court may, upon a change of circumstances
two years after the entry of the decree, treat the mortgage payments
as being in the nature of alimony. 3 It may order the continuation
of these payments as alimony when the former husband has re-
ported them as alimony on his tax returns and the parties together
have treated them as alimony.
D. Rehabilitative Alimony
Rehabilitative alimony should be awarded only when the wife
(or husband) has actual or potential capacity for self-support. When
the wife is middle aged, untrained, has a chronic illness and must
make a home for two minor children, an actual or potential capacity
for self-support is lacking." Permanent (rather than rehabilitative)
alimony should not be awarded when the wife has the ability and
the desire to be self-supporting."
It is inappropriate for a court to award rehabilitative alimony
to a wife who has been awarded custody of two minor children, ages
three and six, and who has expressed a desire to remain at home
with them during their formative years.'2 Even'though she is young
and the marriage was of short duration, permanent alimony should
be awarded where she lacks any employable skill or training.
When it will take substantial time for a wife to convert property
into income-producing assets, she should be granted additional re-
38. Ulbrich v. Ulbrich, 317 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975), following Bunn v. Bunn, 311
So. 2d 387 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975), in which the court was of the view that the seemingly contrary
position in First Nat'l Bank v. Ford, 283 So. 2d 342 (Fla. 1973), was in fact dicta rather than
a square holding.
39. Pacetti v. Pacetti, 332 So. 2d 670 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
40. Yohem v. Yohem, 324 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
41. Cann v. Cann, 334 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976). Unfortunately, this case will be
cited widely for almost every prosposition in family law because of the fantastic amount of
dicta. Twenty-three headnotes for a simple case are ridiculous.
42. King v. King, 316 So. 2d 322 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
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habilitative alimony to support her during this conversion time.43
The rehabilitative concept of alimony may not be applied retroac-
tively in a modification of alimony proceeding dealing with an
award of alimony made prior to the adoption of the Dissolution of
Marriage Act."
It is reversible error for a trial court to award rehabilitative
alimony when the wife is forty-three years old with no income or
training, she will be age fifty-four when her youngest child becomes
eighteen, and the husband earns $52,000 per year.45 In the view of
at least one district court it is not reversible error for a trial court
to award permanent rather than rehabilitative alimony to an un-
skilled fifty-two year old wife who has been married for twenty-five
years and has given birth to five children, when the husband has an
income of $50,000 per year and she says that she has no intention
of going to work." The appellate court stressed that it had to accord
utmost respect to the exercise of discretion by the trial court in
resolving such a case.
E. Lump-Sum Alimony
The Supreme Court of Florida, in reversing the District Court
of Appeal, Second District, has held that when the income of a
husband and wife is approximately equal, the wife should not be
awarded lump-sum alimony, nor should she be awarded attorney's
fees.47 In addition, the parties should be ordered to share equally the
debts incurred by them during marriage. Three justices, in a strong
dissent, argued that the court did not have jurisdiction over the case
because it was not in conflict with prior cases, and that all the court
was doing was disagreeing with the results reached by the trial and
district court. In a subsequent supreme court decision the majority
followed the dissent's reasoning when they held that an award of
lump-sum alimony by the trial court should not be disturbed by an
appellate court unless there is a clear showing of an abuse of discre-
tion by the trial judge."
In the event that a husband divests himself of much of his
43. Lopez v. Lopez, 326 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
44. Mosher v. Mosher, 321 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
45. McNaughton v. McNaughton, 332 So. 2d 673 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
46. Sommese v. Sommese, 324 So. 2d 647 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
47. Cummings v. Cummings, 330 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 1976).
48. Sisson v. Sisson, 336 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 1976), rev'g 311 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
1977]
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property by placing it in a spendthrift trust in a situation where the
wife had contributed her services during the marriage to the parties'
operation of a motel and other rental property, a court may order
lump-sum alimony in addition to an award of permanent alimony."
While recognizing the broad discretion of the trial court in
awarding alimony, the Court of Appeals for the First District has
ruled that it is reversible error to award lump-sum alimony to a wife
who is seven years younger than her husband, is better educated,
and has an income almost equal to his. 0 It is also reversible error
for a trial court to award lump-sum alimony to a wife where the wife
is earning more than her husband and her husband has no assets of
any real consequence, is indebted to the Internal Revenue Service,
and is being sued by several creditors.5 "An award of lump-sum
alimony should never be made unless the spouse being required to
pay is in a financial position to make payment of such gross award
without impairing or endangering his economic status." 52
Where, prior to dissolution proceedings, the husband has con-
veyed his half interest in the marital home to his wife, an award of
lump-sum alimony should not be used to force the husband to reim-
burse the wife for money taken out of a joint account or to protect
her from liability for a note on which the husband forged his wife's
name.53 The note would not be enforceable against her in any event
because of the forgery.
It is the view of at least one district court of appeal that when
a wife has devoted herself to her family as a housewife "rather than
pursuing and acquiring material goods,"' while her husband has
acquired a substantial estate and has earned a substantial income,
she is entitled to lump-sum alimony in an amount sufficient to
compensate her for her contribution to the marriage.
F. Enforcement of the Award
Under section 61.12 of the Florida Statutes (1975), pension
funds held by the City of Miami under its'municipal employee's
49. Thompson v. Thompson, 325 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
50. Cannon v. Cannon, 323 So. 2d 9 (Fla. lt Dist. 1975).
51. Bradley v. Bradley, 327 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
52. Id. at 254.
53. Robinson v. Robinson, 321 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975), cert. denied, 336 So. 2d
603 (Fla. 1976).
54. Goldman v. Goldman, 333 So. 2d 120, 121 (Fla. lst Dist. 1976).
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retirement system are subject to garnishment by the wife of a retired
fireman who is seeking alimony and child support, even though a
city ordinance provides that such funds are not subject to garnish-
ment.5 The rationale is that the city ordinance is designed to pre-
vent creditors of the family from depriving it of support rather than
to prevent a member of the family (the wife) from obtaining funds
for the support of the family.
Even though Texas may forbid the awarding of alimony be-
cause of its community property laws, Florida may characterize a
Texas decree dividing community property as tantamount to an
award of alimony.56 Thus, a Florida court may permit garnishment
of a husband's federal pension under Federal law which permits
garnishment for alimony, where the husband is in arrears on a com-
munity property settlement pursuant to a Texas divorce decree.
The Supreme Court of Florida, reversing a district court opin-
ion,57 has held that in contempt proceedings for failure to pay ali-
mony as ordered, the trial court, prior to entering an order of con-
tempt, must make an affirmative finding that the contemptor pres-
ently has the ability to pay and willfully refuses to do so, or that he
previously had the ability to pay but divested himself of that ability
through his own fault or neglect in order to frustrate a subsequent
order. 8
A contempt order which imprisons the contemptor for a fixed
period of time for his willful failure to pay support is invalid on its
face, because the order must provide that the contemptor may be
released at any time if he complies with the order. 9 It is reversible
error to order that a contemptor not only must pay accrued alimony
and child support (which is proper) but that he also must pay sums
which are to become due in the future in order to purge himself of
contempt.10 Likewise, it is reversible error to enter a judgment of
contempt for failure to make future payments of alimony." The
adjucation of contempt must refer to past not future conduct.
55. City of Miami v. Spurrier, 320 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975), cert. denied, 334 So.
2d 604 (Fla. 1976).
56. Williams v. Williams, 338 So. 2d 869 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976), applying 42 U.S.C. 659
(Supp. V 1975).
57. Faircloth v. Faircloth, 321 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
58. Faircloth v. Faircloth, 339 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 1976).
59. Damkholer v. Damkholer, 336 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
60. Roberts v. Roberts, 328 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
61. Wright v. Wright, 331 So. 2d 395 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
19771 1023
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
In a case of apparent first impression, it has been held that
when a judicial circuit embraces more than one county a husband
is entitled, in the absence of a waiver, to be tried on a contempt
charge in the county in which the case was filed, rather than in
another county where the judge resided."2
Where arrearages have not been reduced to a money judgment,
a Florida court has no jurisdiction to hold a husband in contempt
for failure to pay alimony and child support as ordered by a Georgia
court. 3 The husband may be held in contempt by a Georgia court,
but he is not in contempt of a Florida court. On the other hand, if
the arrearages under the Georgia judgment are reduced to a money
judgment in Florida, the husband can be sentenced for contempt for
failure to comply with the Florida judgment. Moreover, since for-
eign money judgments for past due alimony and support payments
have long been enforceable in Florida by a nonresident wife through
contempt proceedings, there is no reason why a domestic money
judgment for arrearages in alimony and support money may not also
be enforced by the contempt process. However, an order sentencing
the husband to jail for an indeterminate period, or until he pays past
due alimony, or until further order of the court is void for indefinite-
ness.
84
Expenditures made by a husband upon a building owned by
him and his former wife as tenants in common are not sufficiently
compelling criteria to permit a setoff against his alimony obliga-
tions, although a trial court may have jurisdiction to impose such a
setoff.65 Once it is determined that the husband has the financial
ability to pay the back alimony but willfully refuses to do so, a
contempt order is appropriate.
G. Modification of Alimony
If a foreign decree which deals with alimony and child support
is made a Florida decree, it may be modified only upon a showing
of a substantial change of circumstances in the same way that an
62. Taylor v. Taylor, 325 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
63. Grotnes v. Grotnes, 338 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976), receding from State v.
Muldrew, 308 So. 2d 136 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975), which had held that the contempt process
could not be used after accrued alimony under a Florida decree had been reduced to a money
judgment because this would be imprisonment for debt.
64. Grotnes v. Grotnes, 338 So. 2d 1122, 1126 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
65. Bock v. Bock, 336 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
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original Florida decree could be changed." A foreign judgment for
alimony or child support is entitled to full faith and credit in Florida
as to past due installments. The Florida court may not modify the
foreign decree retroactively unless the rendering state's laws permit
it. Further, in the absence of any proof to the contrary, there is a
presumption in Florida that the rendering state's laws do not permit
retroactive modification. 7
It is reversible error for a trial court and an appellate court to
modify an alimony award without any showing of changed circum-
gtaneg.68 When a husband's financial condition has improved and
the wife's financial condition has also improved, but the wife's im-
provement was contemplated by the parties when they agreed on
alimony provisions, it is not an abuse of discretion for the judge to
refuse to reduce the amount of the wife's alimony."
A husband is not entitled to a reduction in the amount of his
alimony payments in the event that he becomes totally disabled
when his income from the Veterans Administration, Social Security
and a disability income insurance policy greatly exceed his former
earned income.70
H. Legislation
The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services has now
been charged with the responsibility of establishing and.operating
a program to aid "displaced homemakers," i.e., those who have
been displaced by death of their spouses, dissolution of marriage,
etc., in becoming financially secure.7
V. PROPERTY
A. Jurisdiction
A chancellor has .the power in a marriage dissolution proceeding
to refer matters concerning temporary alimony and child support to
a general master, but he does not have a similar power to refer the
matters concerning property rights. The chancellor himself must
66. Lazar v. Lazar, 317 So. 2d 854 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
67. Fugassi v. Fugassi, 332 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
68. Protheroe v. Protheroe, 328 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 1976).
69. Reese v. Reese, 330 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
70. Levine v. Levine, 329 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
71. FLA. STAT. § 409.511 (Supp. 1976).
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determine this matter."
In a well-researched opinion, the District Court of Appeal,
Fourth District, has held that a California divorce judgment which
orders the parties to sell Florida real estate and to divide the pro-
ceeds, is entitled to full faith and credit in Florida as a valid in
personam judgment.73 The husband was served in Utah, where he
was residing, by the use of certified air mail, return receipt re-
quested, in accordance with California in personam service require-
ments. The defendant husband had sufficient minimum contacts
with California to justify the imposition of personal jurisdiction,
since the marital relationship had been established in that state.
The Supreme Court of Florida discharged a writ of certiorari in
the case of Hyman v, Hyman,7" The district court had held that a
trial court has the power in a marriage dissolution proceeding to
reserve jurisdiction for the purpose of settling property rights after
the judgment of dissolution is entered.75 The writ was discharged
because this decision was not in conflict with any prior Florida
appellate decision.
One of the dangers implicit in the current practice of a court's
entering an order dissolving a marriage and then reserving jurisdic-
tion to determine property rights at a later time was presented in
Garfinki v. Garfinkl. 11 The trial court entered an order dissolving the
marriage in spite of the fact that the defendant wife had not pre-
sented testimony by deposition concerning whether the marriage
was irretrievably broken. The court, however, was content to base
a finding of an irretrievably broken marriage on the plaintiff-
husband's testimony alone. The husband later died, and the wife
appealed the order of dissolution. The appellate court reversed and
held that the entry of the order of dissolution upon the court's own
motion was error. It was also error to determine the dissolution
without hearing the wife's testimony. The court then proceeded to
certify the decision in the case as well as the question whether a
dissolution decree which reserves jurisdiction to determine property
rights is in the nature of an interlocutory judgment or a partial
judgment.
72. Little v. Little, 325 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
73. Pinebrook v. Pinebrook, 329 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
74. 329 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1976); accord, Kipnis v. Kipnis, 330 So. 2d 67 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1976).
75. Hyman v. Hyman, 310 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
76. 330 So. 2d 812 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
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A writ of prohibition will not lie to prohibit a trial court judge
from carrying out an order holding a wife in contempt for her failure
to execute deeds in favor of her former husband, even though it is
obvious that the judge who ordered the conveyance has miscon-
strued the relevant circumstances." The proper remedy for the wife
in such a case is an appeal from the order and not a writ of prohibi-
tion.
The court does not have the power to modify a provision in a
judgment which settles property rights between the parties. Hence,
when a judgment orders the husband to pay "the first, second and
third mortgages on the marital home," and the wife later pays off
the second mortgage after the first and third were paid by the hus-
band, the court may not refuse to enter an order compelling the
former husband to continue to make payments to the wife in pay-
ment of the second mortgage.1
8
A trial court in a dissolution of marriage proceeding has the
power to enter an in personam order against the settlor of a Massa-
chusetts trust even though it may affect assets in a foreign state,
provided the order does not interfere with the trustees or the corpus
in the foreign state."9
B. Partition
When a final judgment of dissolution provides that "until the
said resident dwelling [held as an estate by the entirety prior to
dissolution] can be sold by the parties, the wife is hereby granted
exclusive possession thereof to reside therein with the minor chil-
dren of the parties,"" this provision has the effect of making the
former wife the head of the family residing on the property. As a
result the dwelling becomes the homestead of the wife and children,
and a court cannot compel the partition of the property at the
request of the former husband while it is being so used. The court
noted that the dissolution judgment contemplated that the property
would be sold within a reasonable time, hence the trial court had
the power to order a sale, but not partition.
When property is held as a tenancy in common and one coten-
77. State ex rel. Pearson v. Johnson, 334 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
78. Horton v. Horton, 330 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
79. Belsky v. Belsky, 324 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
80. Hoskin v. Hoskin, 329 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
19771
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
ant pays more than his share of the expenses such as taxes and
insurance, he has a right to require the other tenant to pay his
proportionate share. However, when a judgment provides that one
tenant is to have the exclusive right to live on the property, this
right of contribution is deferred until the property is partitioned or
sold at a later date. It is, therefore, reversible error for a trial court
to provide that a wife, who is to have possession of the marital home
and is to pay for the expenses, shall not have any right of contribu-
tion from her former husband for one-half of these expenses.8 '
A husband who is ordered to make the full mortgage payments
on the marital domicile should be awarded an equitable credit when
the property is subsequently partitioned.82 A court may not order
the partition of property unless the parties have agreed to it or there
has been a request for partition in the pleadings. 3
The District Court of Appeal, Second District, has held that
when a former wife has vacated a marital home held as a tenancy
in common, and married another, and her former husband then
occupies the house, he is liable for the fair use value of the house as
an offset against his partition claim against the wife for one-half of
the mortgage payments, taxes, and insurance paid by him after her
remarriage.81 The court rejected the notion that the husband would
not be liable for the use value unless he refused to allow his former
wife the right to occupy the house. The court said it was unrealistic
to expect former spouses to live peacefully in a house when they
could not do so when married to each other.
It is reversible error for a trial court to order a marital home
(held as an estate by the entirety) to be sold in 1980 when interjec-
tion of the issue of sale of the home was not with the consent of the
wife and she had been awarded the use of the home for herself and
her children, the youngest of whom would be age twelve in 1980. s1
A trial court must grant a partition of jointly held property when
the wife's petition is in accordance with section 64.041 of the Florida
Statutes, 8 and the husband does not contest the issue. 7
81. Whitely v. Whitely, 329 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976); accord Jones v. Jones, 330
So. 2d 536 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
82. Buckley v. Buckley, 336 So. 2d 708 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
83. O'Hara v. O'Hara, 327 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
84. Adkins v. Edwards, 317 So. 2d 770 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
85. McNaughton v. McNaughton, 332 So. 2d 673 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
86. FLA. STAT. § 64.041 (1975). This statute requires allegation of specific factors which
are material to the court's determination of the partition arrangement.
87. Pantuso v. Pantuso, 335 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
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A trial court judge may deny partition of real property when it
has been charged with various special claims of the parties in a prior
divorce judgment. 8 A court may make a division of real property
held as an estate by the entirety if one spouse asks for it and the
other spouse fails to object since the question ought to be decided
in formal partition proceedings.89 Further, the court may make a
division of properties without any finding of a special equity in one
spouse or the other if the parties have agreed to this procedure. 0
C. Homestead
The legal morass which can occur when the law of dower is
mixed with the law of homesteads was illustrated in Creary v. Es-
tate of Creary.91 A husband-father lived on a homestead owned in
his name alone. After his death his three children conveyed their
interests to their mother. The former wife of one of the children had
joined in the deed, but the current wife of that child had not. Over
twenty years later, this child died leaving his widow who claimed
dower. The court held that the fact that she had not joined in the
deed did not defeat her right to dower. She was awarded a one-third
interest in her deceased husband's one-third remainder interest in
the homestead. The lapse of time did not bar her claim under any
curative statute.
Inasmuch as the owner of a cooperative apartment has only a
stock interest in the corporation which owns the realty, the apart-
ment cannot be the subject matter of a homestead for descent pur-
poses, 2 even though there may be a homestead exemption for taxa-
tion purposes.
3
D. Special Equities Doctrine
In order for a court to award a spouse a special equity in jointly
held real property the testimony must show that she made contribu-
tions to the acquisition of the asset in a manner "above and beyond
88. Wilisch v. Wilisch, 335 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
89. Schwartz v. Schwartz, 336 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976), following Walton v. Walton,
290 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974); accord, McKenry v. McKenry, 336 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1976).
90. McKenry v. McKenry, 336 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
91. 338 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
92. In re Estate of Wartels, 338 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
93. Ammerman v. Markham, 222 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 1969).
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the performance of ordinary marital duties."94 The fact that the wife
made loans to her husband to enable him to take pilot training
would not meet this standard.
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, has decided that
when a wife has contributed to the down payment for the purchase
of the marital home (held as an estate by the entirety), and has
made forty of the forty-nine mortgage payments, she may be
granted a special equity in the husband's interest as lump-sum
alimony. 5 It is unfortunate that the Third District chose to use
these two terms synonymously when they are separate concepts.
It is reversible error for a trial court to permit a husband to
assert an oral counterclaim for a special equity in jointly held real
property over the objections of the wife's counsel." Reversible error
occurs because the wife could have relied on the law of marital gifts
and therefore have taken no steps to enter into discovery proceed-
ings to determine the issues and to present testimony relative to the
new claim. If a court fails to make a finding that the wife has a
special equity in property held as an estate by the entirety, it cannot
order later that the wife is entitled to more than a one-half interest
in the proceeds of the sale of the property. 7
When a wife's father conveys land to the husband in return for
a promissory note and the husband not only secures a loan to build
a home but also puts some of his own time and money into the
construction, he has created a special equity in the home. A special
equity exists even though the husband had conveyed the property
by quitclaim deed to his wife because the deed recited that the
conveyance was in consideration of the wife's father's cancelling the
note and was "not determinative of any special equity the husband
may have in the wife's property.""
In the absence of a special equity in a house or in the absence
of a lump-sum alimony award, it is error to award the wife a life
estate in the marital home. She may be granted possession, how-
ever, in order to make a home for minor children in her custody.9
94. Olson v. Olson, 321 So. 2d 462, 463 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
95. Collazo v. Collazo, 318 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
96. Gaunt v. Gaunt, 326 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
97. Stossel v. Stossel, 331 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
98. Poston v. Poston, 332 So. 2d 363, 364 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
99. Coalla v. Coalla, 330 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
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E. Awarding of Possession
It is reversible error to award exclusive possession of the marital
home, held as an estate in common, to the wife until any sale or
other disposition of the home by the parties, unless this is part of a
lump-sum alimony award, or it is awarded to the wife in order to
carry out the husband's obligation of child support. 00 When all of
the children are adults, it is error to award exclusive possession of
the marital home to the wife in the absence of an agreement so
providing or the finding of a special equity in the wife. 101
When awarding the marital home (owned during coverture as
an estate by the entirety) to the wife alone resulted in the wife
having assets of approximately $202,000 and the husband having
approximately $21,000, the award was reversed. 0° The parties be-
came tenants in common of the home and the wife was given the
right to use and occupy the home until the minor child became an
adult or until she remarried, whichever first occurred.
F. Presumptions
The Supreme Court of Florida has held that article X, section
5 of the 1968 Florida Constitution, which provides that there shall
be no distinction between married women and married men in the
holding, disposition, etc., of their real and personal property, has
the effect of making all judicially-created presumptions unneces-
sary and no longer effective. 103 For example, a conveyance of prop-
erty by a wife to herself and her husband as an estate by the en-
tirety, no longer creates a presumption that she intended to make a
gift to her husband. Now, record title is "the touchstone," but evi-
dence may be introduced that one party has a special equity in spite
of the record title. The wife who conveys to herself and her husband
for example, may show during subsequent dissolution proceedings
that she furnished all of the consideration for the purchase of the
property. The result may be that she is awarded title to all of it.
100. Watson v. Watson, 324 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
101. Church v. Church, 338 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
102. Pike v. Pike, 332 So. 2d 147 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
103. Ball v. Ball, 335 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1976). This case overruled the presumption rule
which was applied in the following cases decided during the survey period: Coulton v. Coul-
ton, 330 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976); Atkins v. Atkins, 326 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976);
Hyatt v. Hyatt, 331 So. 2d 356 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976); Rutenberg v. Rutenberg, 334 So. 2d 633
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
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G. Conveyances
A contract vendor who is married may not use the refusal of his
wife to join in the conveyance as an excuse for refusing to convey
property to a vendee who did not know of the marital status of the
vendor. The vendee is entitled to specific performance with abate-
ment of the price for the wife's inchoate right of dower. 04
In a case of apparent first impression in Florida, the District
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that a husband and wife,
owners of an estate by the entirety in real property, may convey the
property to a third person by executing separate, identical deeds. 05
They need not execute a joint deed.
A court may order a wife to deliver a deed to her husband in
accordance with a prior property settlement, dependent upon his
paying attorney's fees, a dental bill for a child, and extra monthly
schooling funds for the child, all of which were accrued at the time
of the order.' But the court may not make the transfer of the deed
dependent upon the husband's making future monthly payments
for the support and education of the child, because the husband
would not have full title to the property until the child completed
her schooling. Such a precondition would prevent the husband from
dealing with the property in order to fulfill his support obligations.
When a release and quitclaim deed are given by a husband to
a wife as part of a property settlement agreement in a dissolution
action and the parties reconcile, causing the action to be dismissed,
the quitclaim deed is void.' The husband will remain a joint owner
of the property with his wife.
If a husband and wife own an estate by the entirety in non-
homestead land, the husband can convey his interests to his wife as
part of a bona fide dissolution settlement adopted and ratified by a
divorce court.' 8 This is possible even where the husband has had
numerous judgment liens levied against him. The wife's entire inter-
est in the land is not subject to the claims of lien creditors.
104. Romano v. Pandapas, 330 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976). See also Herzog v. Herzog,
330 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976), which upheld an agreement between husband and wife
that the wife would sell her one-half interest in the marital home to her husband. The
agreement was upheld on the grounds that the husband had paid consideration for the sale.
105. MacGregor v. MacGregor, 323 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
106. Lamar v. Lamar, 323 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
107. Zullo v. Zullo, 317 So. 2d 453 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
108. State Dep't of Commerce, Div. of Employment Security v. Lowery, 333 So. 2d 495
(Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
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The Supreme Court of Florida has reversed the holding of a
district court which had held unconstitutional that part of section
689.11(1), (2) of the Florida Statutes (1973) which permitted one
spouse, without the joinder of the other, to convey his or her interest
in homestead property to the other. 09 The court noted that one
tenant in an estate by the entirety may convey to the other without
the necessity of the receiving spouse's joining in the conveyance.
The court, however, agreed with the trial court that the deed in
question was invalid because there was only one witness to its execu-
tion, and because the husband grantor did not really intend to con-
vey his interest to his wife. The dissent correctly noted, however,
that the husband, who was an expert in real property law, deliber-
ately executed the deed knowing that it was invalid. The dissent
concluded that the husband should be estopped from asserting the
deed's invalidity against his former spouse.
H. Miscellaneous
In a case of first impression in Florida, a district court has held
that an engagement ring is a gift conditioned upon subsequent mar-
riage." 0 If the marriage is not entered into, the man is entitled to
the return of the ring, which can be enforced by an action in re-
plevin.
Former sections 731.34 and 731.35 of the Florida Statutes
(1971),"' which provided for dower rights to widows, but denied a
reciprocal right to widowers, have been upheld as constitutional by
the Supreme Court of Florida."' The court reasoned that the dis-
crimination did not violate the equal protection clauses of the state
and federal constitutions because it was based upon the disparity
between the parties' economic capabilities.
Spouses who had accumulated personal property in Cuba as
Cuban citizens before coming to the United States are governed by
the community property law of Cuba.' This law controls as to those
movables brought into the United States as of the date of entry.
109. Williams v. Foerster, 335 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 1976), rev'g 300 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 1st Dist.
1974).
110. Gill v. Shively, 320 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
111. FLA. STAT. § 731,34-35, (1971) as amended by Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-107 (repealed
1974).
112. In re Estate of Rincon, 327 So. 2d 224 (Fla. 1976).
113. Camara v. Camara, 330 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
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In a dissolution proceeding, a trial court may not award shares
of stock in a corporation to the wife merely because she was an
original subscriber for the shares." 4 It is necessary that evidence be
adduced to determine whether the wife ever became entitled to the
shares through gift, purchase, or otherwise.
VI. ATTORNEY's FEES AND COSTS
A. Fees
A client may discharge her attorney at any time. When the
client does so, a court may not prevent a successor attorney from
representing the client at a Rule 1.540"1 hearing on the grounds that
she has not paid the discharged attorney."' In a similar vein, the
trial court does not have the power in a dissolution proceeding to
order the husband to pay a fee to his attorneys, past or present."7
Any claim must be adjudicated in a separate proceeding.
In dissolution of marriage actions a court has jurisdiction to
award attorney's fees payable by one party to the other's attorney.
But in the absence of a claim of a charging lien, the court does not
have power to adjudicate the fee due from a party to his or her own
attorney; this issue would have to be decided in a separate action. "8
A court does not have jurisdiction to award attorney's fees to
the wife's former counsel to be paid by the husband when a final
judgment of dissolution has already been entered and the time for
filing a petition for rehearing has expired." '
The Dissolution of Marriage Act 20 places the spouses on an
equal plane, sharing equal rights and responsibilities. Therefore, an
appellate court may award attorney's fees to the appellee husband.
The amount of the fees is to be set by the trial court and if the wife's
appeal is devoid of merit, the court should take this fact into consid-
eration in setting the amount.'
An appellate court in Florida may award attorney's fees for
114. Whitener v. Whitener Builders, Inc., 334 So. 2d 322 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
115. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.540 deals with a motion for relief from judgment because of clerical
error, excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence, fraud, or similar defects.
116. Tirone v. Tirone, 327 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
117. Kucera v. Kucera, 330 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
118. Herold v. Hunt, 327 So. 2d 240 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
119. Frumkes v. Frumkes, 328 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
120. FLA. STAT. ch. 61 (1975).
121. Mummaw v. Mummaw, 325 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
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services rendered in the appeal. The court may set the amount itself
or preferably, remand the case to the trial court to assess the
amount. In the latter case, the trial court may not reevaluate the
wife's need for attorney's fees and the husband's ability to pay be-
cause these factors have been decided by the appellate court. 2
Rather, it must determine the reasonable value of the services. It
cannot award a low amount based upon its view of the need and
ability of the parties.
An attorney whose only legal services consisted of an examina-
tion of an antenuptial agreement and some legal research into its
validity is not entitled to an award of attorney's fees from the hus-
band when the wife retained other attorneys to represent her in the
dissolution proceedings." 3
Canon 2 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides
that one of the factors in determining a reasonable attorney's fee is
the amount "customarily charged in the locality for similar legal
service." In a case of first impression, it has been held that when a
custody proceeding is filed and tried in Dade City, Florida, and the
wife employs an attorney from Sarasota, her husband may not be
charged for travel time incurred by his wife's attorney in traveling
from Sarasota to Dade City.' 2' Further, the amount of the fee may
not be based upon testimony showing a reasonable fee in Sarasota.
Rather, it is to be a reasonable fee based upon Dade City standards.
A court may not enter an award of attorney's fees which is
based only upon the self-serving testimony of the attorney and his
invoice for services.'25 It is reversible error for a trial court to require
proof of the amount of attorney's fees by the use of affidavits. 2'
Rule 1.611(a) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure requires
that a spouse who is seeking attorney's fees in a dissolution proceed-
ing must accompany his or her application with an affidavit stating
the financial circumstances of the applicant. However, since this
rule does not provide for any sanction for failure to comply, an
appellate court will not reverse for a failure to follow this rule when
the issue was not raised in the trial court and there is sufficient
evidence to sustain the award.'
122. Ludemann v. Ludemann, 317 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
123. Fisher v. Fisher, 318 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
124. Chandler v. Chandler, 330 So. 2d 190 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
125. Benitez v. Benitez, 337 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
126. In re Marriage of Arnold, 335 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
127. Williamson v. Williamson, 335 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
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B. Costs
Costs of suit are neither damages nor a penalty and need not
be specially claimed. As a result, a court can award costs against a
party in dissolution proceedings long after the final judgment, even
though there is no reservation of jurisdiction in the final judgment
regarding the awarding of costs.' 8 A trial court may not award court
costs by also including certain costs of the appeal.'29
VII. ANTENUPTIAL AND POSTNUPTIAL PROPERTY SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENTS
A. Antenuptial Agreements
A trial court will be justified in invalidating an antenuptial
agreement when it is shown that: (1) the wife's counsel was actually
representing her future husband; (2) her counsel did not properly
advise her of her rights; (3) her future husband's income tax return
which was shown to her did not show his true worth; (4) she was
shown the agreement the day before her marriage and she had no
prior knowledge that her husband was going to ask her to sign any
agreement; (5) the agreement tended to facilitate divorce in its pro-
visions dealing with the homestead; and (6) the husband by his
failure to purchase a life insurance policy in accordance with the
terms of the agreement thereby abandoned the agreement.
130
The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, avowedly follow-
ing the holding of Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, '' has held that when
a prospective husband, eighty-one years old, makes full disclosure
of his assets to his future bride, age forty-seven, and she receives the
advice of her own attorney not to sign the antenuptial agreement
because of its parsimonious provisions in her behalf relative to ali-
mony and support after death of the husband, the court will not set
the agreement aside after the husband's death even though the
financial provisions in favor of the widow are completely improvi-
dent. "Stated another way, any adult contemplating marriage who
is sui juris can voluntarily agree to take all, little, or nothing from
128. Golub v. Golub, 336 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
129. Feldman v. Feldman, 324 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
130. Plant v. Plant, 320 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
131. 143 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1962) (where a prospective wife knows or has reason to know
the nature and extent of her future husband's property, an antenuptial agreement is valid
notwithstanding the parsimonious nature of its terms).
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his or her propsective spouse's estate upon the latter's death, if the
former is fully informed at the time he or she so elects.' 32
A husband, with assets of between $3,000,000 and $25,000,000,
induced his wife to sign an antenuptial agreement a few minutes
before the wedding, after she had talked to his attorneys. He told
her that the wedding would not take place unless she did sign and
that by the agreement she was to receive $1,000 per month as long
as she did not remarry. The District Court of Appeal, Second Dis-
trict, held that, in such circumstances, a presumption arises that
her signature was involuntary and the agreement was set aside. 33 A
trial court is not at liberty to ignore the alimony provisions of a valid
antenuptial agreement unless there is proof of a change of circum-
stances in accordance with section 61.14 of the Florida Statutes
(1975).'11
B. Postnuptial Agreements
In a situation where an alcoholic wife, unrepresented by coun-
sel, signed a property settlement agreement with her husband with-
out knowledge of his wealth; the husband did not inform even his
own attorney of his wealth; and the wife had no skills and she had
quitclaimed her interest in property worth $140,000 for the sum of
$500 in cash, a $12,000 bank deposit from which she would be al-
lowed to withdraw only $200 per month and the husband's promise
to pay the premiums on any insurance which she owned, a presump-
tion that the agreement was obtained by fraud was found to arise
as a matter of law.' 3 If such a presumption were to remain unrebut-
ted, the court would have to set the agreement aside.
When neither the husband, a college graduate, nor the wife,
who had only a high school education, had advice of counsel, and
the husband's father, a layman, had drafted a property settlement
agreement for the parties, it was reversible error for the trial court
to refuse to adopt the alimony provisions of the agreement at the
request of the husband in the absence of evidence of unfairness or
overreaching. 36 The husband had the ability to comply with the
support provisions and the wife needed permanent alimony. In reli-
132. Potter v. Collin, 321 So. 2d 128, 132 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
133. Lutgert v. Lutgert, 338 So. 2d 1111 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
134. Singer v. Singer, 318 So. 2d 438 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
135. Demaggio v. Demaggio, 317 So. 2d 848 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
136. Byrd v. Byrd, 324 So. 2d 659 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
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ance upon the agreement she had joined in the sale of real estate to
enable her husband to pay marital debts.
A wife who enters into a separation and property settlement
agreement with full knowledge of her husband's financial worth
may not, in the absence of any fraud, deceit, duress, or coercion by
him, obtain modification of it even though his income has shown a
dramatic improvement since the making of the agreement.'37 On the
other hand, when a chancellor finds that a separation and property
settlement agreement is the unconscionable product of overreaching
by the wife, with the result that the provisions are oppressive to the
former husband who did not have legal counsel when he signed the
agreement, and when the judge has been misled as to the circum-
stances surrounding the agreement, the chancellor is justified in
setting the agreement aside two years after it was executed and
confirmed by the court.'
3
1
When a separation agreement provides that the husband is to
supply (either build or purchase) a home for the price of $65,000 to
the wife and children and his bad faith prevents performance for a
period of three years, a court has the power to modify the agreement
and order him to supply a home for the price of $75,000 because of
the increase in costs occurring during the interval.'39
Even though a property settlement agreement provides that the
husband is to pay $500 for the wife's attorney fees in the event of a
dissolution, a trial court may, after upholding the validity of the
agreement, award the sum of $12,000 as attorney's fees. 40 The basis
of this finding is that the agreement is not binding as to temporary
alimony, suit money, and attorney's fees while the marriage is still
in existence and the obligation of support still exists. The agreement
is binding for permanent alimony, dower, and inheritance which
accrue after the marriage is terminated.
If a separation agreement provides for the payment of alimony
by the husband's estate in the event that he predeceases his wife,
but it provides neither that this post mortem alimony is to be a
charge against his separate property during his lifetime nor that his
right to convey the property is restricted, it would appear that the
husband's conveyance of his property to himself and his new wife
137. Zedeck v. Zedeck, 334 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
138. Moss-Jacober v. Moss, 334 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
139. Forte v. Forte, 320 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
140. Young v. Young, 322 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
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as an estate by the entirety will not, per se, constitute a fraud upon
his former wife.' Unless the former wife can prove fraud, her right
to post mortem alimony will be simply a charge against an insolvent
estate.
The Fourth District has concluded that although a court may
not use the contempt process to compel a former husband to make
support payments in accordance with a property settlement agree-
ment, the contempt process may be used to compel other acts pro-
vided for in the agreement, such as the execution of instruments.,
The dissent in the case, however, noted that inasmuch as the prop-
erty settlement agreement was ratified by the trial court and the
parties were ordered to comply with its terms, the contempt process
should be available to enforce the final judgment, in addition to the
property settlement agreement.'
Although the parties to a separation agreement use the word
"alimony" in the agreement, use of the term is not conclusive. If the
"alimony" is to be paid as part of a property settlement agreement
wherein each party relinquishes all claims against the other except
as provided for in that agreement, then the agreement may not be
modified upon a change in circumstances as alimony normally
would.' Modification can take place only upon proof that would
justify modification or cancellation of a contract between strangers.
VIII. SEPARATE MAINTENANCE
One of the dangers implicit in filing a motion to dismiss on the
merits was demonstrated in a recent case.' A wife filed a suit
seeking a declaratory decree that she and her nonresident husband
were husband and wife. She alleged that her husband had pur-
chased a home jointly with another woman as husband and wife.
The husband's lawyer filed pleadings, including a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The
wife then amended her suit asking for alimony unconnected with
divorce, and alleged basically the same facts as in her original com-
plaint. The court held that the motion to dismiss constituted a
general appearance and the court had jurisdiction over the husband.
141. Scott v. Dansby, 334 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
142. Burke v. Burke, 336 So. 2d 1237 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
143. Id. at 1239.
144. White v. White, 338 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
145. McKelvey v. McKelvey, 323 So. 2d 651 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
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IX. CUSTODY AND SUPPORT OF CHILDREN
A. Custody Jurisdiction
If a child is within the state of Florida on the date that a
dissolution action is filed which seeks his custody, the court has
jurisdiction to award custody. This jurisdiction cannot be defeated
by a nonresident spouse's coming to Florida and removing the child
without the consent of the other spouse. '"
B. Criteria for the Award
In order to determine the question of custody of very young
children, it often becomes necessary to attempt to reconcile appar-
ently conflicting rules. One of the clearest articulations appeared in
a recent case:
In any child custody proceeding, the welfare of the child is the
prime consideration ...
Other things being equal, prime consideration should be
given to the mother of a child of tender years in custody proceed-
ings . ..
However, when the evidence reveals that "other things" are
not equal then the primary consideration accorded the mother is
subservient to the best interests and welfare of the child.
There is a clear distinction between fitness of parents and the
best interests of a child. Both parents may be fit but "other
factors" may determine with which of the fit parents a child's
interests and welfare will be best served.
When, as here, there is a dearth of evidence in support of the
position of the mother, as opposed to overwhelming evidence in-
dicating that it is for the interests of the child for its custody to
be awarded to its father, any "presumption", "prime considera-
tion", or "natural edge", abiding with the mother is overcome
and custody should be awarded to that parent in whose custody
the best interests of the child will be served, in the light of the
evidence adduced. 1
47
However, where the parents are both equally fit to have cus-
tody, the custody of very young children will be awarded to the
mother.'48 It is reversible error to enter an order providing for div-
146. Periolat v. Periolat, 336 So. 2d 1256 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
147. Snedaker v. Snedaker, 327 So. 2d 72, 73 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976) (emphasis by the court)
(citations omitted).
148. Klavans v. Klavans, 330 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
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ided custody of sibling children between mother and father in the
absence of compelling reasons for such an order.149
Under section 39.10(6) of the Florida Statutes (1975), when
both parents are unfit to have custody of their children, the court
is not to award custody to a foster home or state agency when the
children have close relatives who are "'fit, ready, able, and willing
to be awarded such custody. ... "150 If, however, the court finds
that these close relatives (for example, maternal grandparents) are
not fit, then custody is to be awarded to the Division of Family
Services.
It is reversible error for a trial court judge to order that "'nei-
ther party is given primary custody of the children of the parties,
said children remaining in their joint custody and being entitled to
live with either party.' "'' As the appellate court noted: "[T]o give
a fourteen year old girl the unbridled discretion to choose the
parent with whom she will live invites the possibility of serious
disciplinary problems."' 52
There must be a showing of an abuse of discretion by the trial
court before an appellate court may substitute its judgment for that
of the trial court on the issue of which parent should have custody
of a child. As a result, when a trial court awards custody of a minor
to his mother, even though she has been guilty of adultery, because
the judge thought it was in the best interests of the child to do so,
the district court may not reverse this award without making a
finding of an abuse of discretion.'53
It is reversible error to condition a father's temporary custody
upon his compliance with each provision of the final judgment of
dissolution.154
C. Social Investigators' Reports
In a case of first impression in Florida, the Supreme Court of
Florida has held that section 61.20 of the Florida Statutes (1975) is
149. Doane v. Doane, 330 So. 2d 753 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
150. Delafield v. Vreeland, 334 So. 2d 292, 293 (Fla. lst Dist. 1976), quoting, FLA. STAT.
§ 39.10(6) (1975).
151. Gall v. Gall, 336 So. 2d 10, 12 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
152. Id.
153. Dinkel v. Dinkel, 322 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 1975); accord, Ross v. Ross, 321 So. 2d 443
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
154. Dubocq v. Dubocq, 338 So. 2d 67 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
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not unconstitutional on the ground of lack of due process, nor on the
ground that it infringes on a parent's right to confront witnesses.'55
The statute permits a court in custody proceedings to order the
Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services to make an in-
vestigation and social study concerning all pertinent details relating
to the child and each parent, and further permits a court to consider
the written report in making a decision on the child's custody. The
Supreme Court of Florida opined that the nature of custody pro-
ceedings necessitates certain modifications in traditional trial pro-
cesses. The dangers of false reports are alleviated because of the
special skills and training of the social workers who make them. As
long as these reports are made available to the parties and their
counsel for rebuttal evidence, procedural due process requirements
are satisfied.
Under section 61.20 of the Florida Statutes (1975), the court
may request the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services
to make an investigation in any action where the custody of children
is at issue. The statute is permissive, however, and the court, in its
discretion, need not request such an investigation and report.,5"
A social investigator's report in custody matters must be made
part of the record and be made available for review by the parties,
unless they have consented to its being considered without being
made part of the record and without being available for their re-
view.'57
D. Visitation Privileges
It is an abuse of discretion and reversible error for a trial court
to increase the visitation privileges of a father when the available
evidence tends to show that this increase would be detrimental to
the welfare of the child.'58
E. Removal of Children from the Jurisdiction
It may not be abuse of discretion for a trial court to provide, in
a custody judgment, that the mother having custody may not re-
move the child from the judicial circuit. Such a restriction was
155. Kern v. Kern, 333 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1976).
156. Elliott v. Weyman, 337 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
157. Hosking v. Hosking, 318 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
158. Purvis v. Carver, 326 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
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imposed in a case in which the court had reservations about award-
ing custody to the mother, the paternal grandparents (who lived in
the circuit) were interested in the child, and it was in the best
interest of the child to maintain her residence in the circuit.',
In the event that the parties stipulate that a judicial hearing
shall be confined to the issue of a husband's request to remove a
child from Florida temporarily, it is a denial of due process and
reversible error for the trial court judge to decide the question of
permanent custody over the appellant husband's objections., "
In a case of apparent first impression since the adoption of the
Dissolution of Marriage Act,'6' it has been held that even though a
final judgment of dissolution is silent about the continued residence
of the former wife and children in Florida, a court in subsequent
proceedings does have the power to enjoin temporarily the former
wife from removing the children permanently from Florida.' The
original dissolution judgment had given liberal visitation rights to
the father, and at the time of the final hearing in the dissolution
action, the mother had no intention of taking the children out of the
state. The standard for enjoining such a move is the best interests
of the children.
F. Modification of the Award
It is difficult to alter custody arrangements based upon a
change in circumstances. The movant must prove "substantial"
change from the time of entry of the original judgment. The District
Court of Appeal, Second District, has held the following facts insuf-
ficient to justify a change in custody from the mother to the
father: (a) the child changed schools three times in one year; (b) the
child's grandparents live in the same city as the father; (c) the
mother's work schedule in California would require other persons to
care for the child for two hours a day; and (d) the father has remar-
ried and overcome a drinking problem.' The court reasoned that
159. Brandon v. Faulk, 326 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
160. Connors v. Connors, 327 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
161. See text accompanying note 120 supra.
162. Scheiner v. Scheiner, 336 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
163. Robinson v. Robinson, 333 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976). The court in Robinson
reversed a trial court's modification of a custody decree. In a case involving change of custody,
the Supreme Court of Florida recently held that an appellate court cannot overturn the
decision of a trial court unless a clear abuse of discretion has been shown. Spradley v.
Spradley, 335 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 1976), rev'g 312 So. 2d 215 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
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the father had not met his burden of proof because: (a) despite
changes in schools, the child was at the top of her various classes;
(b) the location of the grandparents was not controlling; (c) the
original judgment had contemplated that the mother would work,
and (d) the father's recovery from his drinking problem was not
enough to justify a modification of custody.
Where both spouses claim a change in circumstances and seek
modification, no modification of custody will be granted where each
spouse fails to prove a "material" change in circumstances.' 4
X. SUPPORT
A. Adult Children
The District Court of Appeal, First District, is of the view that
a divorced parent is not liable for the support of his children who
are over the age of eighteen and who are in college unless there is a
finding that the children are "dependent children." ' 5 The mere fact
of college attendance does not indicate dependency. The court noted
that since a parent in a family living in domestic tranquility has no
duty to furnish a college education, a parent has no greater duty
when the marriage has been dissolved.
B. Modification
If custody of a child is removed from the mother to the father,
who is awarded permanent custody, then the order should also pro-
vide that the support payments previously awarded to the mother
for the support of this child should cease.' 6 A modification of the
support provisions of a dissolution judgment may be made when
conditions actually change. It cannot be based upon some change
anticipated in the future.' 7
It is an abuse of discretion for a trial court judge to refuse to
grant an increase in child support solely because the agreement of
the parties at the time of the dissolution contemplated that the
164. Carroll v. Carroll, 336 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
165. Dwyer v. Dwyer, 327 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976); accord Krogen v. Krogen, 320
So. 2d 483 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975); Coalla v. Coalla, 330 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976). Unless a
court finds that children are dependent for support because of some physical or mental
handicap, it may not award child support beyond the age of eighteen. Baldi v. Baldi, 323 So.
2d 592 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
166. Curley v. Curley, 327 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
167. Anderson v. Anderson, 317 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
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physician-father's income would increase in a few years.' This con-
templated increase is a factor to be considered, but it is not to
constitute a bar to an increase when the father's income has shown
a dramatic improvement and the needs of the children have also
increased.
A father who continues to pay child support in ignorance of the
fact that his child has married is entitled to a credit against future
payments for another child.'
C. Criminal Nonsupport
In a recent case, the former wife testified that she had not
received support checks, but the defendant-former husband testi-
fied that he had placed one check in her mailbox and had mailed a
second one to her. 170 The court held that the conviction of the father
for the crime of withholding support from a minor cannot be upheld
when there is an absence of proof that the minor was in need of
support, and the only testimony about nonsupport was given by the
former wife.
D. Support Duties of Grandparents
A court cannot order the paternal grandparents of children to
support them when the maternal grandparents have actual custody
of the children.'' When the children do not reside with paternal
grandparents, they do not stand in loco parentis, and they are not
bound to support them on this basis. The legal duty of support rests
with the father of the children and not the grandparents, even
though custody has been taken from the father and given to the
maternal grandparents.
E. Miscellaneous
The District Court of Appeal, First District, has receded from
its decision in Hardy v. Hardy.' The First District now holds that
168. Siegel v. Zimmerman, 319 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
169. Holt v. Holt, 330 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
170. Griner v. State, 322 So. 2d 647 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
171. Engle v. Engle, 323 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
172. 118 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1960). The court in the Hardy case had held that
"[sleparate amounts should be awarded for alimony and for support of each minor child in
all cases." Id. at 107.
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it is not necessary for a trial court to allocate separate amounts of
child support for each child in all cases.' 3 It is still necessary, how-
ever, to allocate separate amounts for alimony and child support.
At least one district court of appeal is of the view that when the
father's income is quite limited he should not be liable for the pay-
ment of ordinary optical and dental bills in addition to paying for
child support.'74 If extraordinary optical and dental bills were in-
curred, then the trial court could consider modifying the award. A
final judgment of dissolution which provided that the husband was
to pay "all extraordinary medical bills for the said minor children"
has been interpreted by another appellate court as encompassing
medical bills for a medically supervised weight reduction program
for an obese daughter who has been unable to lose weight by her own
efforts."
Under section 61.13 of the Florida Statutes (1975), a parent
may be ordered to give security for the payment of child support
when the other parent has custody of the children. However, the
court may not order the father to maintain his term life insurance
policy as security for child support when the children are in his
custody. "
F. Legislation
The law governing support of dependent children has been ex-
tensively amended with the repeal of sections 409.2452-2509 of the
Florida Statutes (1975), 111 and the adoption of a new act. The new
act provides that: (a) any payment of public assistance by the De-
partment of Health and Rehabilitative Services to a dependent
child creates a debt owing to the Department by a responsible par-
ent since the dependent child, by receiving aid, has made, in effect,
an assignment to the state of his right against the parent;'78 (b) the
Department is authorized to bring actions for support;7 ' and (c)
apparently, persons who are not otherwise eligible for aid from the
Department may use the Department's facilities to collect support
173. Jones v. Jones, 330 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
174. Kippert v. Kippert, 327 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
175. Bertram v. Bertram, 334 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
176. Simon v. Simon, 319 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
177. FLA. STAT. §§ 409.2452-.2509 (1975) (repealed 1976).
178. FLA. STAT. § 409.2561 (Supp. 1976).
179. FLA. STAT. § 409.2564 (Supp. 1976).
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if they pay reasonable fees.18 0 The act seems well intentioned, but
the description of a "dependent child" it provides appears trouble-
some. A dependent child "means any person under the age of 18, or
under the age of 21 and still in school, who has been deprived of
parental support or care by reasons of death, continued absence
from the home, or physical or mental incapacity of a parent."'' This
provision could be construed to mean that a father who has deserted
his family will be liable for college education of his children between
the ages of 18 and 21, while a father who has continued to fulfill his
support role would not likewise be liable.
XI. ADOPTION
Section 63.072 of the Florida Statutes (1975), authorizes a court
to enter an order of adoption in the absence of consent by a natural
parent when he has abandoned the child. In a case of apparent first
impression in Florida, it has been held that the imprisonment of a
father under a lifetime sentence of rape and kidnapping does not,
per se, constitute abandonment of the child.' 2 As a result, when the
natural father contests the adoption proceedings, an order of adop-
tion in favor of the stepfather may not be granted. On the other
hand, another district court has upheld a trial court's finding in an
adoption proceeding that the voluntary conduct of the mother in
committing some illegal act resulting in her being imprisoned for
nine months constituted an abandonment of her child.' 83
In order to deprive the natural father of his child in adoption
proceedings it is necessary to show by clear and convincing evidence
that he has abandoned the child.' s4 His mere failure to furnish sup-
port is not enough by itself to justify the adoption over his protests.
An acknowledgment is not mandatory to a valid consent given
voluntarily by the natural mother in adoption proceedings. Once it
has been given it may not be revoked unless it was obtained by fraud
or duress.'85 A natural mother's oral consent to an adoption made
when she participated in the adoption proceedings before the court
180. FLA. STAT. § 409.2567 (Supp. 1976).
181. FLA. STAT. § 409.2554 (Supp. 1976).
182. Harden v. Thomas, 329 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
183. Watson v. Watson, 330 So. 2d 848 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
184. In re Adoption of Wilson, 328 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
185. In re Adoption of Cox, 327 So. 2d 776 (Fla. 1976), rev 'g 299 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 4th Dist.
1974), following In re Stonehouse's Adoption, 155 Fla. 223, 19 So. 2d 788 (1944).
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would be a sufficient compliance with section 63.082(2) of the Flor-
ida Statutes (1975),116 even if her prior written consent was not in
compliance with the section. "7
A trial court does not have the authority to preclude the Divi-
sion of Family Services from filing a future petition for the perma-
nent commitment of five children to the Division for the purpose of
adoption.' Orders dealing with the welfare of children are always
subject to modification upon a substantial change in circumstances.
The plea of res judicata is generally an affirmative defense
which must be pleaded unless its existence appears on the face of
the opposing pleading. Hence, when grandparents allege in their
petition of adoption that the circumstances have substantially
changed since the rendition of a judgment two years previously
which denied their right to adopt, the defense of res judicata would
have to be pleaded specifically by the opposing natural mother."9
When paternal grandparents have been denied the right to
adopt a grandchild, it is reversible error for the court to award
visitation privileges to them over the objection of the natural
mother.8 0
A. Legislation
The legislature has sought to remedy the lot of "special needs
children" (children whose permanent custody has been awarded to
the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services or to a li-
censed child placing agency and who have established significant
emotional ties with their foster parents, or who are not likely to be
adopted because they are six years old or older, mentally retarded,
or physically or emotionally handicapped, or of black or racially
mixed parentage) by authorizing subsidies for support and medical
expenses to be paid to adopting parents of these children. Adoption
fees are also waived for parents who participate in this program."5 '
186. FLA. STAT. § 63.082(2) (1975) provides that a consent that does not name or other-
wise identify the adopting parent is valid if the consent states that it was voluntarily executed
and that identification of the adopting parent is not required.
187. In re Adoption of Degroot, 335 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
188. Division of Family Servs., Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. S.R., 328 So. 2d 270
(Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
189. Glass v. Armstrong, 330 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
190. Roberts v. Davis, 328 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
191. FLA. STAT. § 409.166 (Supp. 1976).
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In all cases in which the custody of a child has been awarded
to the Department or to a licensed child-placing agency, the Depart-
ment of Health and Rehabilitative Services or the child-placing
agency must petition a court to review the status of the child after
the child has been in foster care for six months. The department or
agency must then conduct an investigation and supply a report
along with its recommendations to the court. The court may then
conduct a hearing and determine if the child is to continue in foster
care, or to be returned to a parent, guardian, or relative, or if pro-
ceedings should be instituted to terminate parental rights and le-
gally free the child for adoption. This act is designed to help ensure
a permanent home for children who are in foster care by requiring
a periodic review of their statuses. If the child is continued in foster
care, at least an annual review of his status must be made."2
XII. JUVENILES
A trial court has the power under chapter 39 of the Florida
Statutes (1975), to order the Division of Family Services to place
five dependent siblings in the same foster home pending an adjudi-
catory hearing."3 It is reversible error to adjudicate a child to be a
dependent child in the absence of a filed written petition and with-
out notice being given to the Division of Family Services."'
A trial court has the power to order a doctor to administer blood
transfusions in life and death cases to minors when the parents have
refused permission because of their religious beliefs and the doctor
has asked for the order to protect himself against a possible mal-
practice suit if he should be "authorized" by a guardian ad litem
rather than "ordered" by the court to do so."'
XIII. DELINQUENCY AND CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
A. Jurisdiction
A court has no power to order a twenty-three year-old man
who is charged with a crime to be transferred to the juvenile divi-
192. FLA. STAT. § 409.168 (Supp. 1976).
193. Division of Family Servs. v. State, 319 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975); In re F.B. v.
State, 319 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
194. Division of Family Servs. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. J.F., 327 So. 2d 128
(Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
195. In re Ivey, 319 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
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sion of the circuit court for trial, despite the fact that he has the
mentality of a ten year-old child.' The juvenile division of the
circuit court does not have jurisdiction to supervise the daily opera-
tions of the Division of Youth Services in the care and custody of
juveniles committed to its care.'97
A court has no authority under Florida case law or legislation
to award a fee to a guardian ad litem in a juvenile detention pro-
ceeding. It may not order the Division of Health Services to pay the
fee,' nor may it award an attorney's fee to be paid by the state for
representation of a child.'
A juvenile court cannot require the Division of Youth Services
to place a child in a particular school as a condition of probation,
nor can the court put a child on a fixed probation period, because
the law requires that probation continue until the child reaches his
twenty-first birthday unless he is sooner released.""
B. Waiver of Jurisdiction
A trial court judge who waives jurisdiction over a minor and
transfers his case for criminal prosecution must state in his order the
reasons for finding that there are no reasonable prospects for reha-
bilitating the minor. 0' A mere recital of the serious crimes charged
against the minor is not sufficient.
Rule 8.090 of the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure provides
that a summons shall be served on a parent having custody or on
the actual custodians, notifying them that a hearing is to be con-
ducted to determine whether jurisdiction over the minor is to be
waived in order that he might be tried in a criminal case as an adult.
Rule 8.090 has not been satisfied and waiver proceedings are invalid
where the record shows that the required notice was given to a
minor's sister with whom he was living, and she expressed a lack of
interest; where there was no proof that a summons had been deliv-
ered to the minor's mother (a certified letter was sent but there was
196. State v. Bradshaw, 337 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
197. Florida Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., Div. of Youth Servs. v. Crowell, 327 So.
2d 115 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
198. Florida Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., Div. of Youth Servs., Bureau of Field
Servs. v. R.M.A., 327 So. 2d 844 (Fla. lst Dist. 1976).
199. State v. Gladstone, 325 So. 2d 443 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
200. T.W. v. State, 338 So. 2d 549 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
201. Spencer v. State, 332 So. 2d 30 (Fla. lst Dist. 1976).
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no return receipt); and where the mother did not attend the hear-
ing. 2
02
Section 39.09(2)(e) of the Florida Statutes (1975) and Rule
8.110(b)(5), Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure, provide that a
minor and his parents have the right to examine psychological and
psychiatric reports used in proceedings to transfer a juvenile to the
criminal division of the circuit court. The minor and his counsel
have the right to question the parties responsible for these reports.
However, when the minor's counsel advises the judge to read a
report and "take it for its weight," without admitting it as an ex-
hibit, this constitutes a waiver of the minor's rights of confrontation
and cross-examination, even though a portion of the report was read
to the judge at closing argument.0 3
A grand jury indictment of a juvenile for alleged criminal acts
may not be used in lieu of a petition alleging delinquency in waiver
of jurisdiction hearings designed to transfer the juvenile's case to a
criminal court.
20 4
In upholding the constitutionality of section 959.115 of the Flor-
ida Statutes (1975), the Supreme Court of Florida held that:
We conclude that a juvenile offender, who is properly certified to
be tried as an adult without a prior juvenile adjudicatory hearing,
may be sentenced either as an adult or as a juvenile under Section
959.115, Florida Statutes. When he fails to comply with or adapt
to the rehabilitative treatment authorized by the statute, he may
be returned to the trial court for an-evidentiary determination
that he is not amenable to such a rehabilitative program. The
trial court, upon so finding, may impose any sentence it could
have originally imposed. The situation is identical to a revocation
of probation. To hold otherwise would eliminate any incentive
the youthful offender might have to successfully complete this
less restrictive rehabilitative program, and would cause trial
judges to rarely use this sentencing alternative."'
202. L.C.L., Jr. v. State, 319 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
203. D.A.B. v. State, 329 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
204. A.D.T. v. State, 318 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975); see State v. Robinson, 336 So.
2d 437 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976), which deals with the question of the applicability of Transition
Rule 18 and section 39.02(5)(c) Florida Statutes (1973), to a person who allegedly committed
murder when be was seventeen but was not arrested and indicted until he was 18; and with
the effect of the change of age of majority from 21 to 18. The court held that the juvenile
court lost jurisdiction when the indictment was returned.
205. Jones v. State, 336 So. 2d 1172, 1174 (Fla. 1976).
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C. Speedy Trial'Rule
In a case whose facts predated the adoption of rule 8.120 of the
Rules of Juvenile Procedure, which provides for the right of speedy
trial to juveniles, the Supreme Court of Florida held that because
of the difference between delinquency proceedings and criminal
court proceedings, a juvenile may not substantiate a claim of a
denial of a speedy trial under the sixth amendment to the United
States Constitution."' Nor may he claim that he was denied equal
protection under the fourteenth amendment because the proce-
dural rights of juveniles and adults do differ. The decision seems
questionable, but because of the adoption of rule 8.120 the decision
may not have much impact.
Section 39.05(7) of the Florida Statutes (1975), provides that
"[o]n motions by or in behalf of a child, a petition alleging delin-
quency shall be dismissed with prejudice if it was not filed within
thirty days from the date the complaint was referred to the intake
office." 7 On the other hand, rule 8.020(b)(5) uses similar language
but it uses the verb "may" rather than "shall." A district court has
held that the statute is substantive while the rule is procedural and
therefore, the statute supersedes the rule. 0 8 The result is that a
court must discharge a juvenile from a delinquency charge which
was filed more than thirty days after the complaint was referred to
the intake office. Another district court has held, however, that the
statute is procedural (not substantive) and is subject to the exclu-
sive rule-making power of the Supreme Court of Florida, with the
result that the child may be discharged within the discretion of the
court. 20 ' This court also held that the word "shall" when used by the
legislature to prescribe the actions of a court should be construed
to mean "may," with the result that even if the statute were control-
ling, dismissal would still be discretionary.
Discharge of a juvenile under the speedy trial rule for failure to
prosecute in a timely fashion for delinquency on armed robbery
offenses cannot support a plea of former jeopardy since he had not
been placed in jeopardy .21 No trial ever started. But such a dis-
206. State v. Boatman, 329 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 1976), rev'g 306 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1975).
207. FLA. STAT. § 39.05(7) (1975) (emphasis added).
208. In re S.L.M., 336 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
209. S.R. v. State, 336 So. 2d 662 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
210. Rawlins v. Kelley, 322 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 1975).
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charge is an estoppel against a subsequent prosecution of the juve-
nile for the same offenses.
D. Delinquent Conduct
If the evidence shows, at most, that a juvenile allegedly engaged
in prostitution in a "quiet and orderly manner," and the judge
acquits her of the charge of prostitution, he may not find her guilty
of disorderly conduct." The activities of the juvenile might be suffi-
cient to show that she was in a need of supervision, but not that she
was guilty of disorderly conduct.
When the facts show that a juvenile mother spends her nights
on a street corner in an area in which she does not live, and that
she approaches cars and engages the drivers in conversations for the
purpose of prostitution, and fails to leave the area after being
warned by a police officer, this is sufficient to show a violation of
the Florida loitering and prowling statute."' These facts show that
she was prowling at a place and time and in a manner not usual for
law-abiding citizens, and such prowling threatens a breach of the
peace or the public safety.
A determination that a juvenile is guilty of delinquency for
loitering and prowling cannot be sustained in the absence of proof
that the arresting officer gave the juvenile an opportunity to explain
his presence and conduct, or proof that it was impracticable to give
the juvenile such an opportunity in accordance with the require-
ments of section 856.021 of the Florida Statutes (1975), which makes
loitering unlawful under certain circumstances."'
It is reversible error for a judge to find, as a matter of fact, that
a juvenile accidently broke a window and then to find her guilty of
willfully, maliciously and intentionally damaging the property of
another. "'
If no testimony is produced sh6wing that a juvenile had any
knowledge that a short-barreled rifle was in the trunk of his car, and
the testimony does show that he did not have a key to the trunk of
the car and that the key was given to a police officer by a third
person who was not a passenger in the car, an adjudication of delin-
211. E. G. v. State, 326 So. 2d 445 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
212. B.A.A. v. State, 333 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
213. L.L.J. v. State, 334 So. 2d 656 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
214. K.G. v. State, 330 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
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quency cannot be sustained on appeal. 15
Section 775.087(2) of the Florida Statutes (1975), provides that
whoever is convicted of certain enumerated crimes while he is carry-
ing a firearm must be sentenced to a minimum term of three years
imprisonment. In a case of first impression, it has been held that
when a juvenile is adjudicated delinquent as a result of committing
one of the acts proscribed by the statute while carrying a firearm,
he does not come within the statute because: (a) he is not convicted
but merely adjudicated a delinquent child; and (b) section
39.11(4)21" states that commitment of a delinquent child to the Divi-
sion of Youth Services shall be for an indeterminate period of time,
and a court has no jurisdiction to commit for a fixed period of
time."2'
E. Confessions
Section 39.03(3)(a) of the Florida Statutes (1975), provides that
if the person taking a juvenile into custody determines that the child
shall be detained, he shall immediately notify the child's parents or
legal custodians. Hence, when a juvenile is taken into custody and
detained as an escapee from the state training school and his re-
quests for permission to telephone his parents are denied, any con-
fessions given by the juvenile relating to grand larceny are inadmis-
sible into evidence even though he was given the Miranda warn-
ings."' The same section of the statute also provides that an arrested
juvenile should not be detained in an adult police station or jail. If
he is so detained and confesses to a crime after being removed to a
youth hall and after being given the Miranda warnings, the effect
of this overnight detention is a factor which must be considered by
the trier of fact in determining whether the confession was volun-
tary.2
1 9
A fourteen year old boy was invited by a deputy sheriff to go to
the sheriff's office for questioning. The sheriff declined to tell the
boy the purpose of the questioning until they arrived at the office
when the deputy gave the boy the Miranda warnings. After being
questioned for approximately forty minutes, the boy confessed to
215. C.W.C., Jr. v. State, 334 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
216. FLA. STAT. § 39.11(4) (1975).
217. M.W.B. v. State, 335 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
218. Dowst v. State, 336 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
219. B.M. v. State, 337 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
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breaking and entering a building with intent to commit a misde-
meanor. The District Court of Appeal, First District, held that his
confession was invalid because it was not the result of his free and
unrestrained choice and was a violation of his fourth amendment
rights. 2 0
F. Appeals
Section 39.14(1) of the Florida Statutes (1975), provides that
appeals in juvenile delinquency proceedings may be taken in the
manner prescribed by the Florida appellate rules, but nothing is
stated as to whether the appeal is perfected under the civil or crimi-
nal appellate rules. A district court has held that considering the
nature of a juvenile delinquency proceeding, an appeal ought to be
perfected under the criminal appellate rules .
22
G. Criminal Proceedings
In accordance with the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Breed v. Jones,222 the Supreme Court of Florida has held that
when a juvenile court has taken jurisdiction over a juvenile accused
of criminal conduct, taken testimony and adjudicated him to be a
delinquent child, jeopardy has attached, and the state may not
thereafter try the juvenile for murder as an adult.
2 3
For cases where a minor is charged with a crime which is pun-
ishable by death or by life imprisonment, a Florida statute provides:
"should the grand jury fail to act within the fourteen-day period, the
court may proceed as otherwise required by law. ' 224 This statute has
been interpreted to mean that the state has fourteen days to indict
before there can be an adjudicatory hearing in a juvenile court.
25 If
the grand jury fails to indict then the juvenile court is free to pro-
ceed. The grand jury may indict after the expiration of fourteen
days in the event that the juvenile court has done nothing in the
interim.
The common law rule that a child between the ages of seven
and fourteen was rebuttably presumed incapable of committing a
220. In re R.L.J., 336 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
221. D.J. v. State, 330 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
222. 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
223. Smith v. State, 316 So.. 2d 552 (Fla. 1975).
224. FLA. STAT. § 39.02(5)(c) (1975).
225. State v, Meagher, 323 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
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crime has been held by two district courts to be inapplicable to
juvenile court proceedings."' These courts reason that the common
law rule developed from the desire to protect children from the
rigors of the early penal system, while the juvenile court system is
designed to help the child. The remaining two district courts re-
cently articulated a contrary view. 27
XIV. GUARDIANSHIP
Section 744.3105 of the Florida Statutes (1975),22s required that
a verified petition for appointment of a guardian be filed with the
circuit court. Hence a circuit court did not have jurisdiction to
appoint a guardian unless a statutory petition was filed."2
At the time their parents were killed in an automobile crash,
the legal residence of minor twins was in St. Johns County. The
circuit court in St. Johns County assumed jurisdiction and ap-
pointed a local bank as guardian of the minors' property. Subse-
quently, a suit for guardianship of the persons was instituted in
Putnam County where the children were residing with the relatives
who instituted the suit. Since venue had never been waived in St.
Johns County, the District Court of Appeal, First District, held that
the Putnam County proceedings should have been transferred to St.
Johns County. 30 Therefore, the order of the circuit court in Putnam
County, which granted the guardianship of the person to a maternal
uncle, was reversed and remanded with instructions to transfer the
case to St. Johns County.
In a case of first impression in Florida, the District Court of
Appeal, Second District, has held that a court may award attorney's
fees to a petitioner whose actions resulted in the resignation of the
guardian and a consequential benefit to the estate of the ward, even
though a third person was eventually appointed guardian.2 31
The guardian of a ward has the right to withdraw funds from a
bank account which is in the name of the ward and another person
226. R.D.C. v. State, 332 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976); K.P. v. State, 327 So. 2d 820
(Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
227. State v. D.H., 309 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976); In re E.P., 291 So. 2d 238 (Fla.
4th Dist. 1974).
228. Repealed by Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-222, § 25.
229. In re Guardianship of Lewis, 323 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
230. In re Guardianship of Ettel, 324 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
231. In re Guardianship of Dean, 319 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
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as joint tenants with right of survivorship in the same way that the
ward could if he were competent. 32
Section 440.19(3) of the Florida Statutes (1975), provides that
the running of the period of limitations in workmen's compensation
proceedings is suspended until a guardian is appointed to represent
an incompetent workman. If compensation proceedings are con-
ducted without the appointment of a guardian they are improper
even if the incompetent is represented by counsel.233 The losing
claimant may insist upon the appointment of a guardian and new
proceedings to award compensation.
XV. ILLEGITIMACY
A court has the power to enjoin the Division of Family Services
of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services from at-
tempting to ascertain the identity of a natural father of an illegiti-
mate child being placed for adoption. 3 If the natural father has had
custody of the child, has contributed to its support, or has otherwise
tangibly indicated interest in the child, he must be given notice of
the hearing for adoption, but a father who does not fall within this
category need not be notified. Any attempt to identify him would
be constitutionally unnecessary and counterproductive.
An unwed pregnant woman cannot enter into a valid agreement
with the alleged father to release him from liability to her for child
support in a paternity action."' This decision seems somewhat in-
congruous (as pointed out by the dissenting opinion of Chief Judge
Boyer), in light of the fact that the mother may undergo an abortion
without the father's consent. She may kill the fetus but she may not
contract away its right of support.
Section 742.011 of the Florida Statutes (1975), provides that
"any unmarried woman who shall be pregnant. . . may bring pro-
ceedings . . . to determine the paternity of such child." This section
has the effect of preventing a married woman from bringing such an
action. The statute has been held unconstitutional by the Florida
232. Cape Coral Bank v. Kinney, 321 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
233. Aris v. Big Ten Taxi Corp., 330 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 1976).
234. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Herzog, 317 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975),
following Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), and Rothstein v. Lutheran Social Servs.,
405 U.S. 1051 (1972). See also FLA. STAT. § 63.062(1)(b)(4)-(5) which requires notice to the
natural father if he has acknowledged and supported the child.
235. Shinall v. Pergeorelis, 325 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
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Supreme Court as an unreasonable and invidious discrimination
against the child, depriving him of equal protection of the law as
required by the Florida and federal constitutions.23 In light of this
case, a district court has held that a mother who is validly married
to another may testify that her children were the illegitimate chil-
dren of a person now deceased in order for them to claim inheritance
rights.237 A son who was born out of wedlock, but whose father subse-
quently, on repeated occasions both before and after he married the
mother, acknowledged in writing that he was the father and raised
his son until he was an adult, is a legitimate son under section
742.091 of the Florida Statutes (1975) and section 731.29(1) of the
Florida Statutes (1973).35 He is, of course, also the "blood issue" of
his father. Therefore he may take as a beneficiary of a trust estab-
lished by his grandfather.
A. Legislation
An unwed pregnant minor may now consent to the performance
of medical or surgical care or services relating to her pregnancy as
if she were an adult.23 An unwed minor mother may also consent
to the performance of medical or surgical care or services by a hospi-
tal, clinic or physician as if she were an adult.
No abortion now may be performed on any woman during the
last trimester of her pregnancy unless: (1) two physicians certify in
writing that, to a reasonable degree of medical probability, the abor-
tion is necessary to save her life or preserve her health; or, (2) one
physician certifies in writing to the medical necessity for legitimate
emergency medical procedures for termination of pregnancy in the




A wife's action for loss of consortium is a derivative right. She
may recover only if her husband has a valid cause of action against
236. Gammon v. Cobb, 335 So. 2d 261 (Fla. 1976), overruling Kennelly v. Davis, 221 So.
2d 415 (Fla. 1969).
237. Williams v. Estate of Long, 338 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
238. Barnett v. Barnett, 336 So. 2d 1213 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
239. FA. STAT. § 458.215 (Supp. 1976).
240. FLA. STAT. § 458.225 (Supp. 1976).
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the tort-feasor. A judgment in favor of the tort-feasor when he is
sued by the husband would bar the wife's action under an estoppel
by judgment theory. By the same token, if the husband has been
successful in a tort suit against the tort-feasor, then estoppel by
judgment should also operate in favor of the wife insofar as the issue
of liability is concerned when she sues the tort-feasor in a subse-
quent action.24
The Supreme Court of Florida, upholding the District Court of
Appeal, Third District, has held that the Florida Emancipation
Act,"' which removed the disability of nonage for all persons who
are eighteen years of age or older, impliedly repealed or amended
the Florida Wrongful Death Act"' which provided that a minor child
meant an unmarried child under twenty-one years of age. 4
Section 768.21 of the Florida Statutes (1975), which denies par-
ents of an adult child the right to damages for mental pain and
suffering for his death, again has been upheld as constitutional by
the Florida Supreme Court. 245
In a case of first impression in Florida, it has been decided that
minor children of an injured father do not have any derivative claim
against a tort-feasor for loss of support, instruction or companion-
ship in any case where the father does not die from his injuries.
2
11
The Florida Dog Bite Statute makes the dog owner an insurer
against injury caused by his dog unless the. injured person "shall
mischievously or carelessly provoke or aggravate the dog." 4' In a
case of first impression, it has been decided that because a child
under six is legally incapable of negligence she is likewise incapable
of carelessness. 248 As a result, when a five and one-half year old girl
accidently rode her bicycle over the tail of a German Shepherd, and
was bitten in the face when she went back to comfort the dog, she
could recover from the owner of the dog.
Section 768.21(6)(c) of the Florida Statutes (1975), provides
that in wrongful death actions "evidence of remarriage of the dece-
241. Davis v. Asbell, 328 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
242. FLA. STAT. § 743.07 (1975).
243. FLA. STAT. § 768.18(2) (1975).
244. Hanley v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 334 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 1976), aff'g 323 So. 2d 301 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1975).
245. Bassett v. Merlin, Inc., 335 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 1976).
246. Clark v. Suncoast Hosp., Inc., 338 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
247. FLA. STAT. § 767.04 (1975).
248. Harris v. Moriconi, 331 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
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dent's spouse is admissible." In a case of first impression, it has
been held that although the evidence of remarriage of the decen-
dent's spouse is admissible, it is admissible solely so that the whole
truth may be known by the jury.24" The jury may not consider this
remarriage in mitigation of any elements of damage recoverable
under the statute by the surviving spouse. In addition, when the
parents of an adult married daughter are parties to the suit filed by
her husband, the parents may recover for loss of services of a house-
hold nature which were regularly performed for them by the daugh-
ter even though the parents did not replace these services with hired
help after her death.
In another case of first impression, it has been held that when
a plaintiff husband does not meet at least one of the threshold
requirements of the no-fault insurance law of Florida, his wife will




Any minor who has reached the age of seventeen may now
donate blood (without compensation) without the consent of his
parents. 5' Consent may not be disaffirmed because of minority un-
less the parents specifically object in writing to the donation or to
the penetration of the minor's skin.
The legislature has recognized the importance of neonatal
health care and has authorized the Department of Health and Reha-
bilitative Services to designate and support (by grants) Regional
Neonatal Intensive Care Program Centers in hospitals in the
state.2 12
249. Smyer v. Gaines, 332 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
250. Faulkner v. Allstate Ins. Co., 333 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
251. FA. STAT. § 743.06 (Supp. 1976).
252. FLA. STAT. §§ 383.15-21 (Supp. 1976).
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